Special Report: Public Health or Public Control? A Look Inside the AG’s Latest Domestic Extremism Task Force Meeting

Extremism, “public health,” and state messaging—what could go wrong?

Framing extremism as a “public health” problem makes almost anything fair game in the name of prevention.

Background of the Group

The Washington State Attorney General’s Domestic Extremism and Mass Violence (DEMV) Task Force (TF) proudly claims to be the first of its kind in the nation. The Legislature funded it purportedly to develop policy and legislative recommendations for a public health and community-based framework aimed at preemptively combating extremism and mass violence—categories that are already subject to criminal penalty. It is increasingly obvious that the governor-appointed TF is a politically-motivated effort to suppress dissent. The panel appears to conflate opposition to COVID-era mandates and lockdown policies—as well as pro-Second Amendment and faith-based perspectives—with extremism. They advance an ideological agenda under the pretense of equity and safety, promoting bias against medical freedom advocates and those challenging state narratives, while stifling legitimate public discourse.

Above: Task Force members roster, which is now displayed only with last initial rather than last name, as it was previously. Public records obtained by ICWA indicate that Big Tech employees and lobbyists were on the invitation list.

Meeting on May 9

The fourth meeting of the DEMV Task Force took place on May 9, 2025, amid continued public scrutiny and support staff turnover. The agenda featured presentations from Bill Braniff and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, who are paid for their advisory involvement, from the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) at American University. Their message underscored the task force’s positioning of extremism as a public health issue, though the public's concerns about civil liberties and government overreach remained unresolved.

In Memoriam: Bill Ramos

A few words were offered in memory of Senator Bill Ramos (D, LD 5), who died suddenly of a heart attack in April during a trail run. Member Juan Perales, president of Unidos in Snohomish County, delivered a salute to Ramos's role in sponsoring HB 1333 and, after the bill’s defeat following public outcry, ensuring taxpayer funding nonetheless via a line in the 2024 budget. In his remarks, Perales referred to the events of January 6, 2021, as an "attempted coup" by "right-wing groups," using this to justify the broader context for the task force’s creation. He also emphasized Ramos's leadership in confronting white supremacy, which Perales claimed places Washington State fifth in the nation for activity, along with white Christian nationalism and domestic extremism.

Public Comment Policy and Participation

The group accepted only written public comments for the meeting, with 41 submissions received. Oral comments had been unceremoniously discontinued after the first two meetings—by unilateral staff decision, not a TF member vote—raising transparency concerns. Staff informed the TF and the public that the change was "to make the process more accessible . . . as well as to ensure that the task force can carry on its work without any disruption or personal attacks against the Task Force members." (ICWA has submitted a public records request for, among other things, the internal discussions on this policy change.)

We do appreciate that the Task Force’s website now posts the written public comments, including those submitted by 5.8.2025 from ICWA objecting to the new policy.

Some TF members acknowledged the public’s lack of trust in government institutions, particularly in relation to surveillance, data collection, and ideological labeling. These concerns were evidently raised by public comments that we hope people will continue to voice.

PERIL's Two Presentations

Above: thumbnail of the two paid PERIL presenters, from their webpage

"Community-Based and Public Health Approaches to Combat Extremism and Mass Violence"

PERIL's new Executive Director, Bill Braniff—who recently led the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, claimed that a public health model is the solution to what he characterized as escalating violence in the U.S., including hate crimes, school shootings, and extremism. Braniff argued that traditional criminal justice tools are too limited and reactive; he insisted that early interventions targeting “risk factors” are more effective.

Braniff identified three main problems this model ostensibly addresses:

1. Volume of violence – He cited statistics about mass casualty plots, hate crimes, and social isolation, painting an alarming picture to justify increased government intervention.

2. Unpredictable forms of harm – Braniff claimed that because we can’t always predict whether someone will become suicidal, violent, or radicalized, we must intervene broadly and early.

3. Structural gaps in law enforcement – He pointed out constitutional limits that prevent authorities from intervening until a crime is imminent, and argued for filling these “gaps” with preventive programs.

   Braniff promoted a range of so-called prevention strategies, including:

• PERIL's K–5 digital literacy curriculum called DUCC, to shape children’s online behaviors before they even own smartphones.

• PERIL's “pre-bunking” videos that expose viewers to manipulative content in small doses to build resistance.

• DHS-funded threat-assessment and case management teams nationwide that have intervened with individuals who showed “concerning” behavior—even if no crime had been committed.
  Braniff claimed that 93.5% of the nearly 1,200 cases ended with individuals getting help instead of being prosecuted—framing this as evidence of success. He argued that even if just 0.1% of the interventions prevented a mass casualty event, the public safety and financial return would be immense.
  However, Braniff’s remarks raised concerns. Critics might view this as a push for ideologically-driven surveillance, pre-crime tactics, and state oversight of beliefs and speech.

• His warning that violence will increase without these programs, and that the federal government may resort to aggressive counterterrorism against U.S. citizens, sounded alarmist—and potentially threatening to peaceful dissent. Braniff praised Washington State for embracing this framework and urged continued investment at the local level. But many are left asking: Who defines what is dangerous—and what happens when dissent is mistaken for risk?

If you can believe it, Braniff compared violence prevention programs to vaccines, saying their effectiveness is best understood statistically, not individually. Just like a vaccine can't guarantee one person won't get sick but it lowers risk across a population, he said, upstream violence prevention works by reducing overall likelihood, even if we can't prove it prevented harm in a specific case.

One of Braniff's most revealing statements was that white supremacist movements in the U.S. have, over the past several decades, strategically shifted away from violence. Rather than relying on force, he said, these groups are now advancing their agendas through cultural and political means. This statement undercuts the very premise of the necessity of a Domestic Extremism and Mass Violence Task Force! If one of the ideologies they claim has been among the most historically violent is now operating through lawful civic channels, that shift calls into question the very rationale for such a task force. The threat landscape has changed, yet the state continues to promulgate the message that we're facing a mounting crisis.

"Extremism Case Study"

Next, self-identified Extremism Scholar and PERIL Founding Director, Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (who receives $240 per hour plus expenses for her involvement with the Task Force per public records), presented two examples—one a former neo-Nazi (Daniel Gallant), the other a radical environmentalist (Daniel McGowan)—to support her case for early intervention and public health-style prevention.

She portrayed Gallant as a traumatized, angry youth who was recruited into white supremacist circles that justified violence through rigid beliefs. McGowan, by contrast, began as a peaceful protester but eventually embraced arson as a political tool when activism felt ineffective. Miller-Idriss framed both men’s violence as outcomes of unmet emotional needs—like belonging, identity, and purpose—that extremist ideologies filled.

She used these narratives to argue for broader, upstream “prevention” strategies, including digital literacy, emotional development programs for young men, and increased interventions into those with “undesirable beliefs” by educators and social workers. She stated that skeptics' "us versus them" or "red pilled" mentalities are risk factors for becoming dangerous and suggested that public health models could de-radicalize individuals and disrupt pathways to violence.

However, she downplayed personal responsibility and ideological agency in favor of framing violent extremists as victims of circumstance. Critics might question how such intervention strategies define “at-risk” beliefs, or whether this model could result in targeting dissent under the guise of prevention.

Miller-Idriss also raised alarm about social media harms, citing an incident in which teens allegedly viewed violent content on Instagram due to a Meta algorithm glitch. She connected this to FBI investigations into so-called “764” grooming networks—though the scope and ideological consistency of these groups remain vague.

Ultimately, her talk reflected a push toward expanding state and institutional influence over thought and behavior—raising red flags about how easily such efforts could conflate extremism with unpopular or non-mainstream views.

Above: “Social-Ecological Model to Violence Prevention” presented to TF members

The PERIL/Luxemburg Report

The PERIL executives indicated that they aren't specifically targeting beliefs that depart from state-endorsed norms, admitting that those thoughts are legally protected after all. They claim their concern is violence. That said, a 2023 joint report by PERIL and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, titled Radicalization in Times of Covid, claimed that the "pandemic" made youth more vulnerable to indoctrination, polarization, and manipulation. The report found that isolation, uncertainty, and distrust in institutions enabled extremist groups to spread "conspiracy theories" and "misinformation" online. “In conspiracy-laden platforms,” it said, “there is a shared skepticism of government overreach and a coordinated campaign of disinformation around the pandemic. One participant described it as, a collection of worldviews that intersect around the collapse of civilization.’”

In Germany, the report said, far-right groups mobilized street protests and appropriated historical symbols. In the U.S., educators struggled with pandemic-related resource gaps while confronting rising antisemitism, anti-Asian hate, and misinformation in schools. The report lamented that both countries lacked digital-ready civic tools to respond effectively, including monitoring and countering “right wing messaging online.”

The authors call for targeted, age-specific interventions emphasizing media literacy, digital resilience, and local adaptation. They also urge the development and evaluation of accessible tools for prevention.

Above: report cover depicting cartoon protesters with “HOAX” signs outside a hospital

Other Key Perspectives from May 9 Meeting

During the meeting, Braniff tried to reassure a couple of questioning panel members that individuals are protected from "overzealous" government actors—particularly at the federal level—simply because NGOs and local institutions receiving funding under public health frameworks do not share personal identifying information with the funding sources. Watchdogs question whether this is sufficient.

Members were reminded that the TF itself does not intend to perform data collection or surveillance activities. Fortunately, one member emphasized that the TF should also avoid recommending such measures to the Legislature.

Walla Walla Sheriff and TF Member Mark Crider voiced concern about conflating constitutionally-protected speech with actual violent acts. He cautioned that prosecuting individuals for their ideas or rhetoric, rather than unlawful actions, sets a dangerous precedent. Crider reiterated some public comments: that law enforcement should intervene only when those threatening ideas are acted upon. PERIL's Braniff responded that this underscores the need for a public health framework to prevent crimes before they occur.

Member Roger Kluck acknowledged public fears about labeling constitutionally protected beliefs and urged that the focus remain on those who incite or engage in violence. He noted that incitement to violence is not protected under the First Amendment and should serve as the dividing line for intervention.

Summary of the Attorney General Task Force’s June 2025 Report

The DEMV's Preliminary Report, issued by staff after the meeting, reiterates its mission to develop policy and legislative recommendations to prevent domestic extremism and mass violence by utilizing a public health and community-based framework. It claims that a prevention approach "offers alternatives to a security-based approach, which includes surveillance, censorship, and incarceration."

Prevention is broken into four levels: (1) primordial, which targets root societal conditions such as polarization, racism, misogyny, and loneliness; (2) primary, which focuses on building resilience at both community and individual levels through education and outreach; (3) secondary, which emphasizes early intervention for individuals identified as being at risk of violence; and (4) tertiary, which deals with recovery, rehabilitation, and community healing after acts of violence.

Because the members decided to delay voting on clear legal definitions for "domestic extremism" and "mass violence," the report notes their absence and anticipates further recommendations by December 1, 2026.

Conclusion

As the Task Force advances toward its final findings and recommendations to the Legislature, due in December 2026, critical concerns remain unresolved. A foundational clash persists between the stated goal of a public-health-centered prevention agenda and the erosion of civil liberties under a framework that still lacks clear legal definitions for “domestic extremism” and “mass violence.” Without those definitions, the potential for ideological overreach remains unchecked. Public distrust, already high, is compounded by vague authority boundaries, data privacy concerns, and the risk of targeting those with dissenting views, problems we have already seen in recent years. Subcommittees are expected to form and develop policy recommendations, but given the Task Force’s somewhat opaque operations and pre-determined framing, these next steps warrant close public scrutiny. Any future legislative proposals must be examined not just for their surface intent, but for how easily they become tools of control—especially when framed as public health.

When “public health” becomes the rationale, almost anything can be justified.

Based on what you know about the DEMV Task Force, tell us in the comments what part of its direction concerns you most. Are there questions you think aren’t being asked—or answers that don’t add up? What do you see that others might be missing? Join the conversation below.